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National Intelligence Daily

Monday 7 January 1980

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7 January 1980


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will often contain materials that update other as		•
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IRAN	
Violence continued throughout Iran over the weekend.	25X
In Tabriz, one person was killed and scores wounded as fighting broke out between followers of Ayatollahs Khomeini and Shariat-Madari. Sixteen people were killed in similar clashes in Maragheh just south of Tabriz. Reacting to the growing violence, Shariat-Madari has once again backed away from a serious confrontation with Khomeini by renouncing support for the Azarbayjani-based Muslim People's Republic Party. He has called for calm in order to preserve national unity.	25X
In the port city of Bandar-e Lengeh fighting between Sunni and Shiite Muslims resulted in at least 28 dead and over 100 wounded. The head of the local Islamic Revolutionary Committees in Esfahan was assassinated Saturday. Spokesmen for minority groups there had been demanding the departure of Revolutionary Guards from the city. Minister of State Foruhar, a presidential candidate and member of the government's delegation to the Kurds, barely escaped an assassination attempt in Tehran Saturday.	25 X
Afghan nationals temporarily occupied the Afghan Embassy in Tehran yesterday; they took 14 hostages and demanded the expulsion of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. They released the hostages and abandoned the embassy on orders from the Revolutionary Council.	25X
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support for the revolutionary government by members of Tehran's influential bazaar is waning. The businessmen are disturbed by the continuing economic deterioration and have become increasingly critical of the government's granting of important posts to poorly educated and ill-qualified persons. They also are concerned over what they perceive to be growing Arab, and particularly Palestinian, influence with Khomeini.	
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Presidential Campaign

Khomeini has decided to turn over to the people the task of determining the eligibility of presidential candidates. It is not clear how this will be accomplished. The Ayatollah said that he will not endorse any of the more than 100 candidates. One of the leading candidates, Admiral Madani, said yesterday that unnamed persons are disseminating false reports about him and that he might withdraw from the race.

Economic Significance of Ethnic Unrest

Iran's economy will be in turmoil regardless of the status of US-Iranian relations if Khomeini cannot quiet the widespread ethnic unrest. The areas of recent ethnic unrest are of major economic or strategic importance.

Khuzestan Province, the home of a large Arab population, produces nearly 70 percent of the country's crude oil. Kordestan, Azarbayjan-e-Khavari, and Azarbayjan-e-Bakhtari Provinces--with large Kurdish and Azarbayjani populations--are important agricultural areas that account for a large share of food production. Iran's main rail and road links with Europe and the USSR run through the latter two provinces. In addition, Tabriz, the capital of Azarbayjan-e-Khavari, is an important industrial center. Baluchestan va Sistan Province in southwest Iran contains the strategically important road and rail links with Pakistan. The rail link terminates at Zahedan, the provincial capital and the site of recent fighting.

Officials in Tehran not only have to worry about the autonomy aspects of ethnic unrest, but also must be concerned with the indirect effects of such dissidence. Unrest in the northwestern provinces disrupts imports from Europe and the USSR that central authorities need to keep popular discontent in check. While Khuzestan Province in the southwest has been relatively quiet since summer, sporadic sabotage of oil facilities continues. This destruction could easily worsen and threaten oil production, particularly if Iraq steps up agitation among the Arab population.

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
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
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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS		
SYRIA: More Violence		
Urban terrorists continue to undermine Preminority Alawite regime.	sident Assad's	25 X 1
Security conditions in Aleppo are of further, despite the recent deployment of 3,000 troops from the Defense Companies President's brother Rifaat. Gun battles occurred only at night are now reporteding daylight hours. Numerous terrorist curity patrols have also been reported ending several weeks of relative calm.	there of about headed by the s that previously ly happening dur- attacks on se-	25X1
The Sunni Muslim extremists thought ble for most of the violence may have the attacks in the capital to embarrass the the two-week-long Baath Party congress terday. Some local observers believe the gress concluded, security forces under the sun will initiate widespread repression	imed the renewed President during that ended yes- hat with the con- Rifaat's direc-	
crush domestic opposition.		25 X 1

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ISRAEL: Coalition Remains Under Pressure	
Despite his recent success in surviving a series of coalition	
crises, Prime Minister Begin will continue to encounter serious	
challenges stemming from Israel's massive economic problems, his	
uncertain health, and cabinet divisions over Jewish settlements	
in the West Bank.	25 X ′
Begin has held his fractious coalition together	
primarily by exploiting a widely shared reluctance to	
risk an early national election. Progress by the newly	
appointed Finance Minister, Yigael Hurvitz, in implement-	
ing economic austerity and in redressing Israel's balance-	
of-payments deficit has provided some assistance recently.	
Hurvitz is unlikely, however, to have any early success	
in curbing Israel's triple-digit inflation rate unless he	
wins support for real wage cuts from the huge labor feder- ation dominated by the opposition Labor Party.	25X ²
action dominated by the opposition habor raity.	23/
Press reports about Begin's declining physical and	
mental capacities continue to encourage jockeying for	
position among potential successors within the dominant	
Likud bloc. While unwilling to confront Begin openly,	
some leading coalition figures probably would prefer	
that Begin resign and support a reconstituted coalition	
under Defense Minister Weizman or some other politically	
attractive Likud leader. Begin's personal popularity	
has dropped to under 30 percent, an alltime low.	25X ²
Begin's next crisis may come in February, when a	
twice-extended deadline expires for relocating the Gush	
Emunim settlement of Elon Moreh. Now located near	
Nabulus on the occupied West Bank, the settlement is to	
be transferred to a new site about six kilometers north.	
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When the site is	
ready, the government's stability is likely to be	
threatened once again if the Gush settlerswho say	25V
they will not moverefuse to leave peacefully.	25 X ′
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BOLIVIA: Challenges to Interim President	
Interim President Gueiler's seven-week-old administration has weathered its initial challenges in the face of continuing opposition from military and querulous political factions.	25X1 25X1
General Luis Garcia Meza, commander of the military academy in La Paz, presented the government with its first serious problem by inspiring conservative officers to reject a Gueiler-chosen high command. The President replaced her Army commander with one more acceptable to	
Garcia Meza's group but stood firm on her other appointments. Garcia Meza epitomizes Gueiler's dilemma: how to formulate policy	25 X 1
decisions without antagonizing conservatives in the mil- itary.	25 X 1
By implementing a necessary but politically unpopular economic austerity program—including a 25-percent peso devaluation and price increases for certain key goods and services—Gueiler has secured needed international financial assistance. She used her friendship with key labor leader Juan Lechin to help calm violent opposition to these moves from labor and peasant groups, and compromised on some price increases without jeopardizing the stabilization program. Nonetheless, new increases or opposition attacks on the economic package could threaten the domestic calm. Anti-US demonstrations could occur as well because of Bolivian opposition to	
Gueiler has called for elections in July, and she must now address issues crucial to the election process. She favors general elections, but those Congressmen who took office only last summer oppose them. Gueiler must also prod Congress to establish clearer criteria for the selection of a new chief executive to serve a full four-year term. A prolonged deadlock over this issue would endanger the timetable for this year's contests and could	25 X 1
prompt further coup plotting.	25 X 1

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PAKISTAN: IMF Credits	
After a year of negotiations with Islamabad the International Monetary Fund has agreed to extend to Pakistan a \$163 million credit for critical balance-of-payments support.	25 X 1
Because the credit is coming from the IMF Trust Fund, Islamabad will be able to avoid the stringent economic measures the IMF frequently requires—and which, in Pakistan's case, would include a devaluation—when it provides financial assistance through its other facilities. The IMF was encouraged by Pakistan's reasonably good economic performance last year. The economy was buoyed by a good wheat crop, rising export earnings, and a continuing high level of remittances from Pakistanis employed abroad. Islamabad promised to curb	
short-term borrowing abroad this year and to limit its budget deficit but is under no obligation to do so.	25 X 1
Even with the new IMF loan, Pakistan will face serious foreign exchange constraints this year unless there are additional loans or debt relief. The government is unlikely to adopt a restrictive financial program in the face of rising domestic and regional tensions over Islam, the Soviet threat from Afghanistan, and tribal	
instability.	25X1

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ICARAGUA-USSR: Soviet Diplomats Ar	rive	
Eleven Soviet diplomats arrived another 20 were expected on Satu	rday. The Soviet	
mbassy may eventually have 100 repr	esentatives, accord-	
ng to a press report. The Soviet A ot been disclosed.	mbassador's name has	
of peen discrosed.		
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OVERNIGHT REPORTS

(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the Intelligence Community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.)

There is nothing of significance to report.

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